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United States and India The Reality and the Hope
byParthaS Ghosh
The Myth of the Democratic Ideal
Scholars m both the Umted States and India have a tendency to view the U S -India relationship as a saga of 
missed opportunity Recently when Harold Gould and Sumit Ganguly edited a volume on the subject they 
wrote m then* introductory remarks that there were high expectations” that there would be natural affinity 
between the world s largest, and Asia s first, fully democratic state ” that is India and the world s most 
celebrated democracy ” that is the Umted States No wonder they called their volume The Hope and the 
Reality1
I have my misgivings about this premise The institution of democracy actually never helped the United 
States and India to gloss over their differences which were structured m their conflicting approaches to the Cold 
War and their divergent readings of history It is only now when the Cold War is over that there is some hope 
there will be a growing convergence of interests On this assumption I have called the relationship the Reality 
and the Hope instead of the hope and the reality ”
In academic circles it is common these days to argue that democracies do not go to war with each other 
This is probably true but democracies have often shown scant regard for democratic movements elsewhere 
After all it was a democratic Britain that had the world s largest empire Moreover m the matto’ of conflicting 
interests democracies are no different than other state types The U S -India relationship provides one of the 
best examples 2
The problem between the United States and India was rooted m the Cold War Not only had the 
independence of India (August 1947) coincided with the toughening of U S posture m the Cold War (George 
Kennan s article on containment” was published just a month earlier)3 the previous U S record in respect to 
India s freedom struggle was not particularly strong Neither in the Quit India movement of 1942 nor in the 
Bengal famine of 1943 did the Umted States do anything visibly friendly that the Indians would have 
remembered fondly Paramount rnU S  calculations was the on going war m which it was definitely more 
important to coordinate its strategy with that of Great Britain than to unnecessarily meddle m India s affairs at 
the nsk of pricking British sensitivities Sir Winston Churchill had a clear world view m which the Anglo- 
Saxons had a definite paternalistic role to perform President Franklin Roosevelt, both on account of his 
personal rapport with Churchill as well as U S national interests m defeating the Axis powers had no reason to 
question the British wisdom 4
1 Harold A Gould and Sumit Ganguly The Hope and the Reality U S  -¡»¿han Relations prom Roosevelt to Reagan (Boulder Cola 
Wesmew Press 1992) p 1 Gould however perceptively remarked “American diplomacy—Eurocentric to fault, ignorant of South Asian 
history and culture unattuned to the power of emerging Asian nationalism inhibited in any event from exercising much imagination by 
domestic political hysteria—had created the very potentiality for political instability economic retardation, hostility to the West, and 
consequent possible Soviet penetration erf the region that it had ostensibly hoped to deter ** See his Chapter on “U S -Indian Relations The 
Early Phase " p. 39
2 In his 1973 foreign policy report to the Congress President Richard Nixon said that it was “sentimentality to assume that just because 
Lidia and the U S were democracies their foreign policies would be identical. See Shivaji Ganguly U S Policy Toward South Asia 
(Boulder Colo Westview Press 1990) pp. 24 51
3 George F Kennan was on the Policy Planning Staff of the State Department. He published his anonymous article “The Sources of Soviet 
Conduct in Foreign Affairs (New York) where he propounded the theory of containment Thu theory however was contested by Walter 
Lippmann who suggested a more aggressive U.S approach to prevent Soviet expansion. See his The Cold War A Study ut U S  Foreign 
Policy (New York. Harper and Brothers 1947)
4 See two most authoritative works on the subject M. S Venkataramam and B K. Shnvastava, Quit India The American Response to the 
1942 Struggle (New Delhi Vikas 1979) and M S Venkataramam, Bengal Fonine o f1943 The American Response (New Delhi Vikas 
1973) About the famine Venkataramam writes. “As I see it, a substantial burden of responsibility for the calamity in Bengal should rest on 
Winston Churchill. President Roosevelt and his principal associates were aware of the nature and magnitude of the famine but failed to 
initiate any concrete action because of their preoccupation with the war effort and their reluctance to offend Churchill on matters relating to 
India. The Americans were in effect, virtually silent onlookers of Churchill s actions if  not hu  accessories I  have used the expression 
Churchillism a few times in my work. While Churchill u  regarded as a great champion of liberty m the Western world Churdullism
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Logically there was nothing abnormal about the way the United States behaved But then the same was 
true of India s doubts about the future of Indo-U S relations East-West relations were becoming more 
complicated and India was not sure which way to tilt The policy of non alignment considered by India to be a 
strategy to ensure equi proximity to both power blocs was grossly misunderstood in Washington as anti 
American5
It is not necessary to go into the details of this perceptional hiatus between the two powers for the subject is 
already well documented 6 What may however be emphasized here is that despite their common democratic 
ideals here were two civilizations proud of themselves for different reasons that were called upon to strike a 
mutually advantageous deal for which neither was willing to accommodate the other beyond a bare minimum I 
have a hunch that had Henry Kissinger chosen to do his research on this phase of U S -India relations he would 
have characterized it as the dialogue of the deaf an expression he later used to underline the deep seated 
perceptional gap between Richard Nixon s global approach and Indira Gandhi s regional approach to the 
Bangladesh crisis 7 Raymond Cohen s recent study Negotiating Across Cultures provides additional evidence 
of the communication gap between the two nauons 8
l
The Problem of Asymmetry
The basic problem between the United States and India is that it is a relationship of unequals Tension between 
the United States and India, based on this inequality has surfaced over and over again for the last forty years 
since the 1954 strategic relationship between the Umted States and Pakistan Neither militarily nor 
economically is India a match for the United States America s status as a global power is after the end of the 
Cold War undisputed while India s status as a mere regional power is disputed by Pakistan India views its 
future in two stages first that it should become an undisputed regional power and second develop clearly 
defined spheres of influence so as to put it on a par with China In India s reckoning it was Washington s Cold 
War strategy that blocked these ambitions However m U S  reckoning India was strategically unrealistic Just 
as the Umted States was frantically looking for allies in the region to challenge the growing power of 
communism India looked elsewhere Indeed by staying out of the U S organized bloc and by pleading for 
Communist China s entry into the Umted Nations it boosted the morale of America s adversaries
It may be argued that India still probably could have attracted Washington s attention if not respect had it 
single mindedly pursued its goals Recall Richard Nixon s rationale to open up to China in 1972 a nation of 
800 million people with nuclear weapons could no longer be ignored India took the first step to go nuclear m 
1974 but did not have the requisite nerve to carry on the process in the face of international opposition Of 
course the Umted States is not going to listen to a nation of 800 million people if it possesses neither nuclear 
teeth nor economic muscle Now under growing pressure from the United States to sign the Nuclear Non 
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) some Indians must now regret having missed the opportunity of going nuclear in 
1974
Economically India matters little to the United States The opposite is not true About 15 percent of India s 
export trade depends upon the United States but its share of U S external trade is not more than 0 5 percent In 
1992 according to a report issued by the U S Trade Representative India ranked thirty sixth in the U S export 
market accounting for a mere $19 billion worth of exports In the same year India exported $3 8 billion worth
was a monstrous abomination as far as the nauons under British colonial tule were concerned By Churchillism I mean a philosophy of 
imperialist arrogance buttressed by a racist belief m the white man s burden expressed m Machiavellian repressive and callous actions 
to preserve and promote imperial interests regardless of the agomes they inflicted on the subject peoples For decades Churchill harbored 
and propagated his malady But during the years of the Second World War when he was the undisputed leader of Britain Churchillism 
came into its own with consequences that hardly add luster to the history of the country that he loved passionately pp vm-ix
5 There were domestic compulsions also for India to follow the policy of non alignment. On this pomi, see Partha S Ghosh Domestic 
Sources of India s Policy of N oi Alignment India Quarterly (New Delhi) 36 (3-4) (1978) 348-62
6 Robert Jervis Perception and Misperception in International Relations (Princeton Princeton University Press 1976) Also see Partha S 
Ghosh Sino-Soviet Relations U S  Perceptions and Policy Responses (New Delhi Uppal 1991) the introductory chapter
7 Henry A Kissinger The White House Years (Boston Little Brown 1979) pp 878-82.
8 Raymond Cohen Negotuiting Across Cultures Communication Obstacles in International Diplomacy (Washington D C  U S Institute 
of Peace Press 1991)
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of goods to the United States 9 As a result the United States figures prominently in Indian politics while India 
does not figure at all in U S politics 10 Intermestic issues have little to do in the formulation of Washington s 
South Asia policy 11
As a result of these military and economic variables India has remained on the margins of U S global 
strategy It was viewed as a hypocritical nation that believed in sermonizing to others while doing precious little 
itself to promote its own interests India s perception of the United States remained that of an equally 
hypocritical nation whose championing of democracy was a ploy to register subservience through other means
The Perceptual Gap
Behind these differing perceptions of economic and strategic interests U S -India relations have been shaped by 
a deeper undercurrent of conflicting perceptions of history The United States as a nation lives in the present, 
but m India the philosophical tradition the past or the future are more relevant Witness the two diametrically 
opposed political debates now raging in India, one over building a temple to a God the other over unleashing 
the Indian economic tiger so as to allow it to prowl in the woods of international trade Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru 
had a better vision of the future than Harry Truman but the future had little meaning for Truman He had to deal 
with the situation then not ten years later As a two hundred year old nation imbued with the belief that there is 
nothing that man cannot do and do quickly Americans fail to understand the lethargy and procrastination of 
Indians to solve their own problems 121 can well appreciate the frustration of Stephen Cohen to push his idea 
for a South Asian Regional Initiative (SARI) among his Indian counterparts No doubt the idea deserves senous 
consideration but South Asia needs more thawing—which Cohen himself grudgingly recognizes 13
The Future NoEuphona
What is the future of U S -India relations9 Is the situation we have discussed showing any sign of change9 
Although there are straws in the wind pointing to some mutual accommodations by and large there has not been 
any significant change so far In the United States at the popular level India is still on the periphery 
notwithstanding the fact that it has absorbed about a million professionally and economically successful Indians 
Although there are some efforts on behalf of the Indian community to partake in the American political process 
so as to make its presence fe lt14 generally speaking it is an insular group that spends more time debating 
developments back home in India than participating in matters that concern Americans Moreover fragmented 
along political lines drawn in India it can hardly provide a coherent Indian picture Even its potential 
contribution to India s economic progress on the patriotic plane is overestimated 15
Americans m general are indifferent toward India. It is only in response to such obscurantist developments 
as the demolition of the Babn mosque the outdated social institution of caste system the danger of nuclear 
proliferation or the alleged human rights violations in Kashmir and elsewhere that India finds occasional 
mention i n US  pnnt and electronic media Even in the universities India related debates and discussions 
hardly attract an American audience Indian study departments are gasping for funds even to maintain their
9 India Abroad (New Yoik) 9 Apnl 1993 p 26
10 SeeParthaS Ghosh Neither Abel nor Cam A Framework of Indo-U S Relations in Robert M Crunden et al eds New 
Perspectives on America and South Asia (New Delhi Chanakya 1984) pp 77-100
11 Intermestic issues means issues that are simultaneously profoundly and inseparably both domestic and international See Bayless 
Manning “The Congress the Executive and Intermestic Affairs Three Proposals Foreign Affairs 55 (2) (January 1977) 309
12. Nehru s greatest problem was that he tried to chisel diplomacy with the tools of a scholar Take for example his U S visit m October 
1949 It was a disaster because he said things that the Americans did not want to hear He was certainly prophetic about several things 
notably the inevitable rift between China and the Soviet Union but it was not the time (China had just fallen to communism and the 
Soviets had exploded their atomic bomb) to expect patient heanng from Americans with an open mind on the subject Nehru s visit instead 
of improving Indo-U S ties damaged them Traman was simply unimpressed by the Indian Prime Minister while Secretary of State Dean 
Acheson had to confess that he was one of the most difficult men with whom I have ever had to deal Dean Acheson Present at the 
Creation My Years in the State Department (New York W W  Norton 1969) pp 334-36
13 Stephen P Cohen A Fresh U S Policy for South Asia and India s Part in Influencing It India Abroad 2 Apnl 1993 pp 1-2 14
14 See Partha S Ghosh Beyond the Amencan Melting Pot India International Centre Quarterly (New Delhi) 17 (1) (Spring 1990) 23- 
32.
15 On this point, see Swaminathan S Anklesana Aiyar Alternative to the IMF Sunday Times o f India (New Delhi) 7 June 1992
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existing programs The fact that young Americans are not studying India is evident from the fact that most 
academic writings or attendance at seminars and conferences are by relatively senior scholars who have been m 
the field for decades 16 No wonder that in the recent presidential debate South Asia did not figure at all 
Whenever some references were made they were in the context of nuclear proliferation 17
This indifference to South Asia is not typical of the United States in relating itself to other regions of Asia 
Both for strategic and economic reasons the rest of Asia is a matter of keen interest. In November 1992 when 
the Washington based Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) prepared its ninety three page 
Agenda 93”—divided into fifty-one chapters—there was not a single chapter devoted to South Asia Notably 
there were as many as ten chapters dealing with East and Southeast Asia on one hand and West and Central 
Asia on the other18
Recently a former U S diplomat surveyed America s role in Asia in 1992 His obsession was so much with 
U S economic interests in eastern Asia that he forgot to remember that Asia also existed westward and 
southward beyond China To quote the diplomat The now famous slogan on the wall of the Clinton campaign 
headquarters in Little Rock reads Its the economy stupid As the Clinton administration begins one assumes 
there was an unwritten second line to that slogan And the economy is global Perhaps there should be also be 
a third Ime And you better pay special attention to Asia 191 think that the diplomat should have added a 
fourth Ime as well And Asia means China eastward
Against this background there are reasons to fear that U S -India dialogue once again might end up as the 
dialogue of the deaf The concerns that Americans show on issues such as nuclear and missile proliferation or 
human rights are matters of marginal importance insofar as Indian politics goes Moreover as discussed above 
they are restrictive of Indian ambitions and pride which no party worth its salt can accept without running grave 
political risks So far there has been no evidence that any of the political parties is preparing it supporters to 
swallow the bitter pill of NPT 20 Rather the Hindu chauvinistic Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) which is gaming in 
strength openly announces its policy of going nuclear if it came to power 21
Also on the question of human rights India does not appreciate the meddling by external powers Faced 
with the greatest challenge to its territorial integrity since independence it views these exhortations as avoidable 
pinpricks Once again as a nation proud of its intellectual tradition and buttressed by more than a hundred years 
of Western liberal education it feels that there is enough room within the system to take care of the human 
rights abuses and would rather not listen to external sermons when the exponent s own record in this regard has 
not always been clean and umform
Restrictions on transfer of technology is yet another potential area of conflict and it is feared that the United 
States might repeat the same mistake it committed m the fifties For example the Cray YMP supercomputer 
deal is now off because India has objected to U S conditions that it calls unacceptable The deal proposed in 
1988 faced rough weather largely because U S officials imposed greater limitations on exports to countries that
16. An average American s image of India has not changed much since the publication of Harold R Isaacs Scratches on Our Minds 
American Images o f China and India (New York John Day 1958) For a recent analysis seeM  J Vinod Images of India m the United 
States Retrospect and Prospect, Indian Journal o f Political Science (New Delhi) 50 (3) (July-September 1989) 376-88 It may however 
be argued that in a society as diverse as America other than Europe or Japan most of the remaining regions of the globe have only 
segmental appeal, if any For example when Nelson Mandela came to the United States he created a huge sur m the media but surveys 
found that only blacks seemed to be paying attention An hour long television interview with Mandela by Ted Koppel gamed just 9 percent 
of a prune time audience extremely low even by the standards of news programming See David Gergen How is America Changing7 
American Leadership The Challenges Back Home Adelphi Papers (London) 257 (Winter 1990-91) 7
17 Foreign Policy Association Election 1992 Guide to U S  Foreign Policy Issues (New York 1992)
18 Center for Strategic and International Studies Agenda 93 CSIS Policy Action Papers (Washington D C  November 1992) Non 
American perspectives were not any different A conference organized m 1990 by the London based International Institute for Strategic 
Studies on America s Role in a Changing World ignored South Asia altogether Unimportant regions (South Asia7) were characterized as
strategic slums that would be left to stew See Adelphi Papers 257 (Winter 1990-91) 107
19 Stephen W Bos worth (former U S Ambassador to the Philippines and Tunisia) The U S and Asia in 1992 A New Balance Asian 
Survey (Berkeley) 33 (1) (January 1993) 104
20 See Partha S Ghosh Foreign Policy Issues m the 1991 Indian General Elections Asuin Survey forthcoming
21 See BJP leader L K Advaru s interview m India Abroad 23 April 1993 p 6 But whether the BJP would actually change the present 
policy of nuclear ambiguity once it comes to power is questionable. Earlier during the Janata rule (1977-80) its leader Atal Behan 
Vajpayee as the Foreign Munster had deviated from his party s Ime m preference of continuity m the policy
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have not signed the NPT in India s case those included having a person from Cray on site at all times and 
restricting physical access to the machine itself22 America may yet face a situation as it has in the past of some 
other industrial nation supplying such technology circumventing the NPT Missile Technology Control Regime 
(MTCR) and other regimes Insofar as know how is concerned the United States may have a slim 
technological lead now but a 1988 survey conducted by the Los Angeles Times and Booz Allen and Hamilton 
found that m advanced matenals supercomputers lasers and fiber optics Japan was fast catching up with the 
United States 23 It should be recalled that in the initial stage of India s industrial development it was U S 
obstinacy not to aid India s steel industry because it was to be in the state sector that ultimately brought m the 
Soviets as partners m India s progress Incidentally two other nations that helped India build its steel industry 
were Bntain and Germany neither of which was socialisuc 24
Climatic Changes Augur Well
In spite of these basic problems there are however reasons to hope for a better appreciation by each nation of 
each other s sensitivities and priorities Two changes that have occurred one in international politics and the 
other in India s domestic politics are bound to have some positive effects The end of the Cold War and the 
growing privatization of the Indian economy provides opportunities for the United States to work out new 
strategic and economic deals with India25 But the task is challenging for the simple reason that it calls for 
differing sacrifices from each state
Each nation has a set of expectations about the other But because of the asymmetry of the relationship if 
American expectations are not fulfilled it would not matter much But if India s expectations are not fulfilled its 
very political stability could be affected The two basic elements of U S foreign policy m the post Cold War 
phase are one to ensure regional peace and two to promote U S economic interests That there is an essential 
linkage between the two elements needs no emphasis 26 India s foreign policy also has two basic elements one 
to ensure India s tern tonal mtegnty which is generally viewed m external terms and two to promote its 
economic interests by integrating itself into the global market
With regard to the economic interests there is not much difficulty although occasional irritants like the 
controversy over intellectual property nghts do surface 27 India could provide a large market for American 
trade and investment although the United States would still have to compete with others m the field such as 
Japan and Germany 28 Similarly Indians would have to attract Amencan capital on a competitive basis since by 
just openmg its market India has not done something unprecedented Moreover Eastern Europe Russia and the 
Central Asian republics have entered the fray as competitors for both aid and investment29 In this regard the
22. Nature 361 (4 Febraary 1993) 387
23 Rustam Lalkaka Is the Umted Sutes Losing Technological Influence in the Developing Countries? Annals (Philadelphia) 500 
(November 1988) 42-43 India itself is fast developing its computer industry and such restncuve practices of the Umted Sutes can 
accelerate the progress Bangalore has already emerged as India s silicon valley See reports in Far Eastern Economic Review (Hong 
Kong) 10 December 1992 pp 45-46
24 Yet another example could be given In the early years of India s independence India was willing to buy from the Umted Sutes bomber 
aircrafts Louis Johnson the then Secretary of Defense was favorably disposed to the idea However probably under British influence the 
deal was not struck. Interestingly it was Britain that subsequently sold to India its Canberra bombers See Ganguly U S Policy toward 
South Asia pp 22 50
25 RameshThakur India After Nonalignment Foreign Affairs 71 (2) (Spring 1992) 165-82
26 This U S interest has been intellectually articulated by Edward A Kolodziej through his OWL model The words Order (O) Welfare 
(W) and Legitimacy (L) correspond to the existing sutes system free market economy and democracy respectively See Edward A 
Kolodziej Coping With Regional Conflict A Global Perspecuve paper presented to the Conference on Coping With Regional 
Conflict, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign October 9-11 1992
27 The Clinton administration s approach to the question of intellectual property nghts would be known after 30 April 1993 the deadline 
set for identifying pnonty countnes and the pnonty watchlist by the U S Trade Represenutive (USTR) Li the mean time the office of the 
USTR, however has noted that the Lidian courts have recently upheld trademark owner nghts in infringement cases. See India Abroad 9 
Apnl 1993 p 26
28 The potential of the growing Lidian middle class has beai noted internationally See Far Eastern Economic Review 14 January 1993 
pp 44-48 John Adam Thomson Indu Towards the Year 2000 Asian Affairs (London) 21 (2) (Old Senes Voi 77) (June 1990) 162-73 
Charles H Percy South Asia s Take-Off Foreign Affairs (Winter 1992-93) 166-74
29 For fiscal 1994 the Clinton administration has asked for a $311 million increase for aid to the former Soviet Union for a total of $704 
million. See India Abroad 23 Apnl 1993 p 22
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rules of the game are already set and both the United States and India know how to deal with one another 
bilaterally
Still it may be argued that it probably would serve India better in the long run if it opts for some kind of 
concessionary approach in dealing with the United States in economic matters This would help the U S 
economy and howsoever small that help is it would be appreciated by that nation given its present mood It 
would also give India an opportunity to expect concessions from the United States m other matters India is 
aware of the fact that but for the good offices of the United States it could not have received the $4 billion in 
credits that enabled it to survive the acute balance of payments crisis caused by the oil pnce hike resulting from 
the Gulf cnsis
Yet another argument could be that technical and commercial relations with the United States probably 
have some added advantage vis á vis other industnal nations Both for cultural and histoncal reasons the United 
States is still the most open society m all respects Value added items find an easier access to Amencan markets 
than to others provided non economic hurdles do not come in the way There is only an international economy 
to which the Amencan economy is connected as if by threads in a w eb30 Although a late comer India can still 
sell m the Amencan market and can attract U S investors provided its liberalization policies are sustained 
effectively implemented and duly advertised31
There are also some positive indications in the fields of secunty and strategy The end of the Cold War has 
helped the two nations to move closer to each other for the simple reason that it was only the Cold War that 
came m the way of their better understanding Although Pakistan was a partner i n US  military strategy there 
were some inherent problems in that relationship Several opmion polls conducted m the seventies and eighties 
revealed that in the Amencan mind India figured more prominently than Pakistan 32 A special issue of The 
Annals published m 1988 was devoted to anti Amencamsm around the world and mentioned India only in 
passmg while a full chapter was allotted to Anti Amencamsm in Pakistan 33
With the possibility of Russian withdrawal from the Indian Ocean and given the Indian perception of a 
growing Chmese naval capability India would not mind an Amencan mantime presence in the Indian Ocean 
region34 Besides the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait has also shown to New Delhi how any cnsis in the supply 
channel of oil could play havoc with the Indian economy Earlier oil shocks of 1973-74 and 1979-80 had 
caused unprecedented inflation influencing the politics of the country Dunng the Gulf cnsis of 1990 when oil 
pnces soared to almost $30 a barrel it was estimated that India s import bill for oil would go up by as much as 
Rs 40 billion m just one year In the 1980s the increasing trade deficits with West Asia were off set to a large 
extent by increasing remittances from the Gulf region But Iraq s mvasion also resulted in the exodus of 
275 000 Indian workers from the Gulf countnes
Cooperation with the United States in the fields of defense and secunty however predates the Gulf War 
Ever since U S Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci s visit to New Delhi in Apnl 1988 efforts have been 
underway to build cooperation in these fields but they remained pnmanly confined to technological agreements 
for manufacturing a light combat aircraft (LCA) After the Gulf War new vistas were opened marking an end 
of India s military isolationism General Claude Kickleighter chief of the U S Pacific Command paid a visit 
to New Delhi m Apnl 1991 and held discussions with the Indian officials about defense cooperation between
30 According to Mike Mansfield former U S Ambassador to Japan the governments of U S states maintain more offices in Tokyo than m 
Washington See Gergen How is America Changing? p 17 See also Paul Kennedy Preparing for the Twenty F irsi Century (New York 
Random House 1993) pp 58-59
31 Sometimes the policies rem am on paper only A run Nehru a former minister of commerce writes that the government only talks of 
borrowing but there is a huge portion of the loan that remains unused because of bureaucratic delays The Economic Challenges Ahead 
The Hindu 26 January 1993 It is also felt that India s entrepreneurs are not showing enough enthusiasm to take up the challenge Abid 
Hussain the former Indian Ambassador to the U S says One economist described India as a uger in a cage When the cage is opened the 
uger would show its real strength The cage is now open but the tiger refuses to come out Instead it is asking outsiders to come into the 
cage India Today (New Delhi) 15 March 1993 p 19 In a recent interview in New Delhi William Henderson senior vice president and 
managing director of the Hong Kong based Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) said What India needs now is image building 
internationally I find that hard sell is not part of the culture here as it is in many other countnes India Abroad 16 Apnl 1993
32. John E Rielly Amenca s State of Mind Foreign Policy Spring 1987 pp 39-56
33 The Annuals 497 (May 1988)
34 Dieter Braun Asian Power India A New Equation Aussenpohtik, 11 (1990) 178
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the two countries The visit was pregnant with political implications particularly for India yet the matter was 
hardly debated during the Indian parliamentary elections that were held only a month later This can be 
interpreted as an indication of an emerging consensus among the political parties on the advisability of 
developing some kind of a security relationship with the United States It is noteworthy that both major Indian 
communist parties were silent The Pakistan factor—both m conjunction with China and as a vocal partner in 
the global Islamic reassertion against the background of a defunct Indo-Soviet treaty—must have been in the 
back of the mind of all concerned35
During the visit of the chairman of India s joint chiefs of staff General S F Rodrigues to the United States 
in September 1991 Washington came out with concrete proposals for defense cooperation Known as the 
Kickleighter proposals they advocated cooperation and partnership by the end of the 1990s through high level 
visits exchanges periodic policy reviews Indo-U S army staff talks and cooperative work in selected areas of 
common interest One of the highlights of these talks was the decision to set up bmabonal army steering council 
headed by the vice chief of army staff on the Indian side and the commanding general of the U S Army 
(Pacific) on the U S side36
The details of these and other discussions are not known but they must have reinforced the shared 
strategic perception which will evolve into a mutual arrangement that benefits both equally to quote General 
S F Rodrigues37 Did this so called shared strategic perception refer to the danger arising out of the growth 
of Islamic fundamentalism in West and Central Asia7
Fear of Islamic Reassertion
Ever since the Iranian hostage crisis and particularly after the end of the Cold War and the dismemberment of 
the Soviet Union the United States has been concerned by the specter of Islamic resurgence in critical Third 
World regions m the Middle East and Central Asia—the former for its oil reserves the latter for its potential as 
nuclear prohferator with portions of the former Soviet Union s nuclear arsenal India also has worries about its 
own Islamic enthusiasts who are demanding the secession of Kashmir from the Indian union
Given this situation there was reason to believe that the United States and India would find common ground 
in dealing with the threat posed by the forces of Islamic resurgence It may be recalled that it was Sir Olaf 
Caroe the British strategist belonging to the civil service of Bntish India who had argued strongly in favor of 
the West s aligning with Pakistan so as to ensure the free flow of oil from the Persian Gulf region America s 
Cold War strategy in the region was partially dictated by this logic 38 But now that Pakistan has become a 
potential Islamic state and therefore less reliable as an ally in this context the United States has reason to tilt 
toward India which is not only a predominantly Hindu and secular state but also is engaged m dealing with 
Islamic forces m Kashmir to preserve the nation s territorial integrity Since these Islamic forces are actively 
assisted by Pakistan India has the added reason to impress upon the United States to declare Pakistan as a 
terrorist state39
It may however be argued that India would probably do better if it recognizes a subtle nuance while 
cooperating with the United States in this matter Its interests would be better served by following a two­
pronged policy Within South Asia it should put the Islamic forces under constant pressure by strictly adhering 
to secularism so that its vast Muslim minority (about 11 percent of the population) feels secure this would blunt 
the edge of Islamic propaganda It must be understood that both the Hindu fundamentalist forces and the Islamic 
fundamentalist forces m Pakistan and Bangladesh thrive on each other s success If both succeed the ultimate
35 Ghosh Foreign Policy Issues in the 1991 Indian General Elections
36 For details see Gautam Adhikan s despatch from Washington in Tunes o f India 8 September 1991
37 Tunes o f India 1 December 1991 and 5 Mardi 1992
38 On this point see Ganguly U S Policy Toward South Asia pp 32-33
39 So far the United Sutes has not declared Pakisun a terrorist sute although there are reports that it is putting pressure on Islamabad to 
desist from assisting Kashmiri terrorists See India Abroad 16 and 23 April 1993 The Karachi based Pakistani news magazine The Herald 
of February 1993 earned stones about the secret mission in December 1992 of Roben Oakley the former U S Ambassador to Pakistan to 
impress upon the Nawaz Shanf government that the Clinton administration would take a senous view of Pakistan s covert interference m 
the affairs of Kashmir See pp 24-30
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winner would be ideologues m Pakistan and Bangladesh who could claim victory for their theory that the 
Indian subcontinent consisted of two nations one Hindu and one Islamic Second it would help them project 
their Islamic identity instead of a South Asian identity
By not subscribing to the U S anxiety about Islamic resurgence per se India can always keep intact its links 
to the Middle East and Central Asian nations thereby making it difficult for Pakistan to turn its and India s 
relation with these states into a zero sum game As a developing country with more and more emphasis on 
export promotion India has a stake m good relations with the Middle East and Central Asian states An anti 
Islamic stance would jeopardize these ties It would therefore be desirable to subscribe to the view expressed in 
a recent study prepared by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace but with sufficient caution The 
study said that the emergence of India as a major military power—with a naval reach encompassing the 
Arabian Sea and much of the Indian Ocean and potentially the Gulf—underlines the importance of maintaining 
and enhancing a friendly relationship with the Indian armed forces The growth o f extremist forms o f Islamic 
fundamentalism in areas adjacent to India especially Southwest Asia and Central Asia could pose common 
security concerns for New Delhi and Washington A cooperative or neutral Indian posture could be a critical 
factor for the United States in the event of American involvement in future conflicts in Southwest Asia and the 
Gulf 40 Perhaps a neutral Indian stance would be more appropriate in select conflicts
Kashmir and Proliferation The Connection
The critical challenge however is to coordinate U S global interests with those of India s regional concerns 
Here the crux of the matter hinges on the nuclear question insofar as the United States is concerned and on the 
Kashmir question insofar as India is concerned If the United States wishes to reconcile both these goals it will 
have to move very carefully so as not to appear imperious During his presidential campaign Bill Clinton had 
promised to clamp down on countries and companies that sell proscribed technologies punish violators and 
work urgently with all countries for tough enforceable nonproliferation agreements His administration has 
now asked for a $68 million increase over 1993s $129 million for nonproliferation and arms control Releasing 
the President s budget proposals for fiscal 1994 the Department of State said One of the mam security 
problems of the post Cold War era is the nsk of proliferation of deadly weapons This administration gives a 
high pnonty to preventing proliferation 41 It is expected that the policy does not involve more arm twisting of 
India than it can politically withstand The approach should be the on going quiet bilateral diplomacy that seems 
to have the endorsement of America s South Asia experts 42 It is hoped that this policy will bear fruit in the long 
run Once India s confidence is built up it would be relatively easy to extract concessions because the Indian 
leaders would then find domestic political opinion more conducive to accepting changes
This rather slow and steady strategy may not be difficult for the United States to follow As previously 
noted India matters little to the United States and consequently there is little likelihood of its getting drawn into 
U S domestic politics even if America does not succeed in getting India to sign the NPT In any case India does 
not have the image of an enemy m the United States
What the United States might bear in mind as well is that the political bureaucratic class that rules India is 
perfectly able to deal skillfully with American pressure Since none of the positions that the United States holds 
say on intellectual property rights on nuclear proliferation on missile technology transfer and so on are either 
logically tenable or universally applicable Indians find it easy to drag the dialogues on indefinitely or till the 
Americans relent Mahatma Gandhi used the same tactics to put pressure on the British using their own 
political and judicial idioms to embarrass them
Building Mutual Trust
At the present juncture both the nations are following a policy of least provocation and slowly moving toward 
building mutual trust While the United States is not putting full pressure on India regarding the nuclear
40 Selig Hamson and Goffrey Kemp India and America after the Cold War (Washington D C  1993) pp 26-27 Emphasis added
41 India Abroad 23 Apnl 1993 p 22.
42. Cohen A Fresh U S Policy for South Asia pp 1-2 Hamson and Kemp India and America After the Cold War pp 36-37
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question the latter is also not over reacting to certain U S moves even though they areioffensive For example 
the Indian reaction to the U S ban on all exports to the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) for two 
years since mid 1992 for its deal with Russia to import cryogenic engines (violating the provisions of the 
MTCR) was unusually low key Notwithstanding rhetorical outbursts in the Indian parliament the government 
simply branded the U S decision as an avoidable ïmtant in our bilateral relationship 143
The challenge is now to consolidate the trend From the Indian perspective the starting point should be a 
clear U S position with regard to the territorial integrity of India m keeping with the existing reality If the 
United States can use its good offices to convince both India and Pakistan to recognize the line of actual control 
in Kashmir as the permanent boundary and thereby end then- forty five year confrontation it would not only go 
a long way toward building confidence between the two states but also ensure an enduring U S influence in the 
region that can be exploited for mutual advantage Stephen Cohen is nght that the road to accession to the NPT 
runs through Kashmir 44 To make the NPT question a high priority issue without solving the Kashmir dispute 
amounts to putting the cart before the horse The Clinton administration must take care not to repeat the failure 
of Jimmy Carter m this regard.45
It has been the consistent policy of the United States not to disturb the states system that emerged after the 
Second World War 46 The disintegration of the former Soviet Union and some of the East European countries 
with its attendant problems for U S foreign policy has mdeed vindicated the U S wisdom in this regard Should 
not the United States then see to it that the existing territorial reality in Kashmir is sanctified since any 
alteration m Kashmir s status is fraught with dangerous implications for regional stability and might cause 
added headaches for Washington for years to come Any change in the territorial situation to India s 
disadvantage would not only create further problems for India s integrity as a nation it would strengthen the 
forces of Hindu nationalism m India to the detriment of both regional stability and India s integration into the 
global economy neither of which is m America s interest
The Chinese Connection
Given India s determined mood to work out a mutually advantageous strategic understanding with the United 
States (reflected in its role during the Gulf War joint naval exercises recognition of Israel and so forth) it is 
possible that it might relax its posture on the NPT 47 But before that occurs two things must happen First, there 
must be a solution of the Kashmir problem based on existing territorial reality The other one is a bit more 
ticklish It concerns China s nuclear capability The Indian strategic community has never failed to point out 
that Delhi s nuclear policy is intricately linked to what happens in China Whether Beijing is a real threat to 
India may be a moot point but the fact remains that there is a psychological compulsion for how the Indian elite 
see India vis á vis China How can India sign the NPT without weakening its position vis á vis China9 One idea 
could be as Cohen argues to give a non nuclear India a permanent seat m the UN Security Council48 India has 
been pleading for the reorganization of the Security Council for quite some time and this gives some scope for 
quid pro-quo
43 Times o f India 13 May 1992 So far the United States has not lifted the ban although it has agreed to allow some shipments in deference 
of contractual obligations agreed upon pnor to the imposition of the ban India Abroad 30 October 1992 and 5 February 1993
44 Cohen A Fresh U S policy for South Asia p 2.
45 One scholar wrote The Carter administration ended its term with a South Asian policy in shambles It had abandoned its own emphasis 
on nuclear proliferation and human nghts yet its failure to anticipate and counter act the Soviet invasion was a major strategic 
embarrassment It wound up with the worst of all worlds Ganguly U S Policy toward South Asia p 237
46 On this point, see Patrick M Morgan The Ambiguities in the American Role paper presented to the Conference on Coping with 
Regional Conflict University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign October 9-11 1992
47 ParthaS Ghosh Post Gulf War Foreign Policy Need for Rethinking Mainstream (New Delhi) 30 March 1991 pp 23-31 J Mohan 
Malik India s Response to the Gulf Crisis Implications for Indian Foreign Policy Asian Survey 31 (9) (September 1991) 847-61 See 
also Tanq Rauf Regional Approaches to Non Proliferation in South Asia, in Tanq Rauf ed Regional Approaches to Curbing Nuclear 
Proliferation in the Middle East and South Asia (Aurora Papers No 16 Canadian Centre for Global Security) pp 93-109
48 Stephen Philip Cohen A Way Out of the South Asia Arms Race The Washington Post 28 September 1992 See by the same author 
India s Regional Impact Seminar (New Delhi) 401 (January 1993) 69-74 Also see ManojJoshi Threat Perceptions Seminar 383
(July 1991) 17-25
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The containment of Chinese power could be m the long term interest of the United States as well and a 
sufficient amount of sympathy from Japan for the move could be expected in this regard China is exposed to 
political instability both on account of its asymmetrical political and economic developments as well as its inter 
regional disparities The combination of an unstable polity and a huge military suggests a potentiality dangerous 
mix At the moment it does not appear that the Clinton administration is seriously considering any drastic 
change in U S -China policy but that does not suggest a closed mind During his confirmation hearings in Apnl 
1993 Winston Lord the nominee for the post of Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of East Asian and 
Pacific Affairs indicated that the government was m favor of continuing the earlier approach that is Shunning 
Chma is no alternative Both on account of U S economic interests as well as strategic reasons (for example 
North Korea s withdrawal from IAEA inspections has enhanced China s importance for it can wield its 
influence on North Korea to make it reconsider its decision) the United States according to Lord should 
conduct a nuanced policy toward Beijing until a more humane system emerges In policy terms the approach 
would be nuanced and balanced with the effort to use MEN [most favored nation] to encourage better 
performance better conduct m China in many areas—proliferation trade human rights for their own citizens 
and with respect to people in Tibet 49 Chma has an $18 billion trade surplus with the United States and as such 
the latter is in a position to wield considerable influence on China If that influence is used to improve the 
human rights situation there as well as contain its military power in collaboration with Japan it would go a long 
way to improve U S -India relations50
All this calls for a sustained U S concern for South Asia and patient diplomacy It is hoped that the new 
Bureau of South Asian Affairs m the Department of State would make concerted efforts to urge a cooperative 
consciousness in the region It is quite likely that any favorable attitude toward India would be greeted with 
suspicion m Pakistan 51 This fear in the Pakistani mind would have to be allayed The basic premises of U S 
policy m the region should therefore be that the United States has continuing interests in South Asia 
(democracy nonproliferation economic liberalization and so forth) and political interests in working with some 
of the South Asian states to pursue common strategic objectives (peacekeeping in and outside the region 
possibly containment of China) 52 Correspondingly India too has a huge stake in expanding its frontiers of 
cooperation with the United States to ensure its security and promote its economic interests together with 
working out strategies to accommodate U S concerns about nuclear proliferation violation of intellectual 
property rights and so on
Conclusion
Writing on current affairs is always a challenge particularly in these days of information explosion Futuristic 
projections about every aspect of human activity and the behavior of states are so much in abundance that they 
are hard to keep track of What is even more problematic is that m spite of an abundance of data correct 
assessments are not always possible Iraq s nuclear capability was not fully assessed until actual UN inspections 
took place According to one expert early wrong estimates were due not to data collection but rather data 
fusion caused by over computerization and jurisdictional concerns in the intelligence community 53
Besides there is always the element of unpredictability in history changing the assumed course of events 
Even a month before the fall of the Berlin wall m September 1990 hardly any knowledgeable West German 
actually foresaw the event Even the influential Deutsche Bank executive Alfred Herrhausen who was one of 
the most optimistic about German reunification believed it would take about a year or two for it to happen54
49 India Abroad 9 Apnl 1993 p 19
50 Cohen A Fresh U S Policy for South Asia pp 1-2. See also C Raja Mohan Nuclear Dialogue with Japan The Hindu (New 
Delhi) 4 February 1993
51 The Carnegie study referred to above has been viewed in Pakistan as anti Pakistan See The Herald February 1993 pp 30-31 35-36
52 Cohen A Fresh U S Policy for South Asia p 1
53 Peter D Zimmerman Proliferation of Missiles and Nuclear Weapons CSIS Agenda 93 p 14
54 Darnel Burstein Euroquake Europe s Explosive Economic Challenge will Change the World (New York Simon and Schuster 1991) 
p 67 In September 1990 the author had conducted fony interviews with West German busmess and pohucal leaders most of whom were 
extremely well informed about the situation m East Germany
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The whole Gorbachev phenomenon was indeed an accident that altered the face of the world almost 
overnight Can one therefore be accurate about the future and if so what should be the time frame7 Paul 
Krugman advises us to be modest for history teaches us to be humble In 1947 most [American] economists 
were pessimists expecting the return of mass unemployment The extraordinary growth of the next twenty five 
years surprised them all In the early 1970s by contrast, nearly everyone was excessively optimistic None of 
the major economic difficulties of the 1970s and 1980s—the energy crisis the productivity slowdown the rise 
of European unemployment, the debt cnsis—was foreseen 55 Paul Kennedy s Preparing for the Twenty First 
Century reflects the same sobriety56
One s approach to future trends in U S -India relations should therefore be cautious Much would depend 
upon the success or failure of India s political and economic developments together with the course of polmcs 
in the United States Present indicators suggest a better climate Everything now depends upon how judiciously 
the opportunity is exploited. Then only the hope would turn mto the reality
55 Paul Krugman, The Age o f Diminished Expectations U S  Economa: Policy in the 1990s (Cambridge Mass MIT Press 1992) p 169
56 Kennedy however writes that we ought to recognize that our endeavors might have only a marginal effect on the profound driving 
forces of today s world We also ought to be aware that interventions (like enhancing female education in developing countries) could 
produce their own unforeseen and unintended changes Nothing is certain except that we face innumerable uncertainties but simply 
recognizing that fact provides a vital starting point, and is of course far better than being blindly unaware of how our world is changing 
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